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Toward a Reconceived Legislative 
Intent behind the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act 
THE PUBLIC-SAFETY RATIONALE FOR 
PROHIBITING BRIBERY ABROAD 
INTRODUCTION 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) became law in 
1977 as an amendment to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act 
(Exchange Act).1 This legislation was in part a response to 
Watergate and to investigations by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC),2 which revealed that hundreds of U.S. 
companies had been bribing foreign officials on a regular basis.3 
In light of this discovery, the FCPA made it a crime for U.S. 
companies and individuals to bribe foreign government 
officials.4 In addition, it imposed requirements on the 
accounting procedures and internal control systems of publicly 
traded companies.5 
Congress addressed foreign bribery by attempting, first, 
to deter the bribery of foreign officials by criminalizing it, and 
second, to detect such illicit activity by mandating accurate and 
detailed records of transactions. This approach reflects the 
legislative determination that bribery of foreign government 
officials, by certain parties, at least, should not be permitted. 
Alongside this admirable objective, however, was a belief that 
the law could not entirely ignore business realities. On this 
view, it was necessary to permit some bribery, lest the 
 
 1 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-231, 91 Stat. 1495 (1977) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2012)). 
 2 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE 
TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 3 (2012) [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE], 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf. 
 3 Patrick J. Keenan, The Future of the Guiding Principles, in PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE ONE HUNDRED FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 301 (2012) (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-640, pt. 4 (1977)). 
 4 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3. 
 5 Id. § 78m(b). 
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competitiveness of American businesses be substantially 
hampered.6 
Recognizing that an outright ban on bribery was 
inappropriate, Congress drafted an exception to the FCPA’s 
anti-bribery provisions. This carve-out permits “facilitating 
payments,” small bribes paid to low-level officials to expedite 
approvals or permits that would be granted regardless.7 The so-
called facilitating payments exception has proved problematic. 
Conceptually, the line-drawing required to distinguish 
facilitating payments from impermissible bribes often is not 
straightforward.8 Practically, the U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ) and the SEC have, over the past few years of enforcement, 
effectively read the facilitating payments exception out of the 
statute.9 As various commentators have noted, it is highly 
questionable for enforcing agencies to proscribe conduct that 
Congress has explicitly permitted.10 
Recent DOJ and SEC interpretations of the facilitating 
payments exception illustrate a larger trend—the renewed, 
vigorous enforcement of the FCPA.11 After the FCPA was 
enacted in 1977, enforcement was all but dormant for 
decades.12 Beginning in 2006, however, there has been a 
marked year-on-year increase in the number of enforcement 
 
 6 “Neither I nor my colleagues on this subcommittee have any desire to 
unfairly penalize U.S. companies in the competition for foreign markets. Therefore, 
some form of international agreement is a necessary corollary to any national 
legislation.” Decl. of Prof. Michael J. Koehler in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, United 
States v. Carson, No. SA CR 09-00077-JVS, at 23 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter 
Koehler Declaration] (quoting Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Trade of the 
Comm. on Fin., 94th Cong. 10 (1975) (testimony of Sen. Frank Church)). 
 7 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(b), 78dd-2(b), 78dd-3(b). 
 8 Michael S. Diamant & Jesenka Mrdjenovic, Don’t You Forget About Me: 
The Continuing Viability of the FCPA’s Facilitating Payments Exception, OHIO STATE 
L.J. FURTHERMORE 19, 23 (2012), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/
groups/oslj/files/2012/06/Furthermore.Diamant.pdf (“But some of the examples of 
qualifying payments provided for by the statute are not necessarily ‘non-
discretionary’ . . . . Nor is the line between discretionary and non-discretionary 
functions always clear as a practical matter . . . .”). 
 9 Id. at 24 (citing TRACE ANTI-BRIBERY COMPLIANCE SOLUTIONS, TRACE 
FACILITATION PAYMENTS BENCHMARKING SURVEY 2 (2009), available at 
http://traceinternational.org/data/public/documents/FacilitationPaymentsSurveyResults-
64622-1.pdf). The study reported that “more than 70% of surveyed corporations ‘either 
never, or only rarely, make facilitation payments, even if their corporate policy permits 
facilitation payments.’” 
 10 Id. at 21. 
 11 Steve Frinsko, Recent Trends in Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Enforcement, 55 ADVOCATE 30, 30-31 (2012), available at http://isb.idaho.gov/pdf/
advocate/issues/adv12MarApr.pdf. 
 12 Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 
913 (2010). 
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actions.13 This increase has been accompanied by a chorus of 
criticisms that has grown steadily louder, with a particular 
focus on the lack of transparency and predictability with 
respect to key terms in the law that trigger liability.14 For 
instance, what kind of organization, precisely, is an 
“instrumentality” of a foreign government whose employees or 
officials cannot receive bribes?15 What additional guidance is there 
to flesh out the meaning of “anything of value” that cannot be 
given or promised?16 What concepts or rules hem in who may 
appropriately be considered a “foreign official”?17 
Part I provides a brief history of the FCPA. It then sets 
out the key provisions, namely, the anti-bribery provisions, the 
books and records provision, the internal controls provision, 
and the facilitating payments exception. 
Part II argues that a sense of moral ambiguity and 
compromise surrounded the passage of the FCPA in 1977. 
Drawing on the legislative history, this part notes that foreign 
bribery initially was cast mainly as a foreign policy issue. It 
then contends that Congress was aware of, but ultimately left 
unresolved, certain normative questions as to why, exactly, 
bribery is wrong. 
Part III turns to China and considers how two 
important facets of Chinese culture, guanxi (relationships) and 
mianzi (social standing), can affect business dealings and 
discusses several important implications for FCPA compliance. 
Part IV analyzes three recent examples of FCPA 
enforcement actions involving Chinese subsidiaries of U.S. 
companies. This part describes violations of the anti-bribery, 
books and records, and internal controls provisions of the 
FCPA, and of Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act. These case 
studies illustrate the types of conduct that the DOJ and SEC 
interpret as impermissible under the FCPA. 
Part V argues that we ought to recognize the undeniable 
and growing threat that corruption poses to public health and 
 
 13 See Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act: Minefield for Directors, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 145, 157-58 (2011). 
 14 See, e.g., Daniel Chow, China Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
2012 WIS. L. REV. 573 (2012); Nicholas M. McLean, Cross-National Patterns in FCPA 
Enforcement, 121 YALE L.J. 1970 (2012); Eric M. Pedersen, The Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act and Its Application to U.S. Business Operations in China, 7 J. INT’L BUS. 
& L. 13, 13-15 (2008); F. Joseph Warin et al., FCPA Compliance in China and the Gifts 
and Hospitality Challenge, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 33 (2010). 
 15 Chow, supra note 14, at 606. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
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safety as a reason to prohibit foreign bribery. This notion would 
help to address the moral ambiguity that undergirds the FCPA 
as it stands today. Further, the danger to public health and 
safety suggests particular ways in which the FCPA ought to 
change. Such a danger also forms a plausible basis for a 
reconceived legislative intent for these reforms, which will 
likely require legislative action because they diverge from, and 
extend beyond, the status quo of FCPA enforcement that the 
DOJ and SEC support. Reasonable minds can differ as to what 
reforms the public-safety rationale calls for. One possible view, 
this note argues, is that these reforms ought to include both a 
prohibition against American firms bribing anyone, not just 
foreign government officials, and a compliance defense that 
operates as a matter of law. 
I. THE FCPA 
A. History 
Congress enacted the FCPA in 1977 as an amendment 
to the Exchange Act.18 Commentators frequently have cast the 
FCPA as a direct result of Watergate.19 That scandal arguably 
contributed to a political atmosphere conducive to the FCPA’s 
passage, but Congress had already been investigating overseas 
bribery and corruption.20 In particular, the SEC conducted a 
series of investigations in the mid-1970s,21 in the course of 
which over 400 U.S. companies admitted to making 
“questionable or illegal payments.”22 More than one-quarter of 
these companies belonged to the Fortune 500.23 Investigators 
also unearthed slush funds that the companies used to pay 
bribes.24 The questionable or illegal payments amounted to 
 
 18 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-231, 91 Stat. 1495 (1977) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2012)). 
 19 See Koehler, supra note 12, at 911 (quoting Carolyn Lindsey, More Than 
You Bargained For: Successor Liability Under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 959, 961 (2009)) (“The FCPA arose out of the Watergate scandal 
in the 1970s. While investigating contributions to Richard Nixon’s re-election 
campaign, Congress discovered that over 400 U.S. companies had paid bribes in excess 
of $300 million through offshore slush funds in order to win contracts overseas.”).  
 20 Id. 
 21 RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 3. 
 22 Keenan, supra note 3, at 301 (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-640, pt. 4 (1977)). 
 23 Id. 
 24 Nicole Y. Hines, Cultural Due Diligence: The Lost Diligence That Must Be 
Found by U.S. Corporations Conducting M&A Deals in China to Prevent Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act Violations, 9 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 19, 22 (2007). 
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more than $300 million,25 or approximately $1.2 billion in 
today’s dollars.26 
After the FCPA was enacted, American companies 
immediately found themselves at a disadvantage against 
foreign competitors that did not face similar restrictions.27 This 
disadvantage persisted for much of the 1990s, when the United 
States was the only country to prohibit bribes to foreign 
government officials.28 Between April 1994 and May 1995, for 
example, the government documented almost 100 instances 
where foreign bribes affected the ability of American firms to 
secure contracts together worth $45 billion.29 Moreover, foreign 
firms willing to engage in bribery won contracts over American 
firms 80% of the time.30 
Congress amended the FCPA in 198831 and again in 
1998.32 The summary below reflects the statute in its current 
form after the second set of amendments. 
B. Provisions 
1. Anti-Bribery Provisions 
The anti-bribery provisions make it unlawful for 
certain people and corporations to corruptly offer, give, 
promise to give, or authorize the giving of money or anything 
of value to foreign officials and other prohibited recipients to 
obtain or retain business.33 
 
 25 H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 4. 
 26 CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/data/
inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
 27 Keenan, supra note 3, at 301. 
 28 Blake Puckett, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, OPIC, and the Retreat 
from Transparency, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 149, 150 (citing JEFFREY P. BIALOS 
& GREGORY HUSISIAN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: COPING WITH 
CORRUPTION IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES 4 (1997)). 
 29 Marlise Simons, U.S. Enlists Rich Nations in Move to End Business Bribes, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1996, at A7, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/12/
world/us-enlists-rich-nations-in-move-to-end-business-bribes.html. 
 30 Sarah C. Kaczmarek & Abraham L. Newman, The Long Arm of the Law: 
Extraterritoriality and the National Implementation of Foreign Bribery Legislation, 65 
INT’L ORG. 745, 751 (2011). 
 31 Title V of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 32 International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 
105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) 
(implementing the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business 
Transactions). 
 33 Id. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a). 
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As to givers of bribes, the FCPA prohibits the following 
classes of persons from giving, or promising to give, money or 
anything of value: (1) issuers34; (2) domestic concerns35; and (3) 
persons36 other than issuers and domestic concerns.37 
As to recipients of bribes, the FCPA prohibits those 
subject to its provisions from giving, or offering to give, money 
or anything of value to the following classes of persons: (1) 
foreign officials38; (2) any foreign political party or party 
official39; (3) any candidate for political office40; (4) any official of 
a public international organization41; and (5) any other person 
who knows that the payment or promise to pay will be passed 
on to one of the preceding types of prohibited recipients.42 
Influencing the recipient or gaining an improper 
advantage occurs when a person gives a gift or makes a payment 
for the purposes of (1) “influencing any act or decision . . . in 
[one’s] official capacity”43 ;(2) “inducing . . . any act in violation of 
[one’s] lawful duty”44; (3) “securing any improper advantage”45; or 
(4) “inducing [the use of one’s] influence . . . to affect or influence 
 
 34 Id. § 78dd-1. “Issuers” are defined as “any company whose securities are 
registered in the United States or which is required to file periodic reports with the 
SEC,” ROBERT W. TARUN, BASICS OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 2 (2006), 
available at http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub1287_1.pdf, or any “officer, 
director, employee, or agent” acting on behalf of such a company, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a). 
 35 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2. “Domestic concerns” are defined as “any individual who is 
a citizen, national or resident of the United States,” id. § 78dd-2(h)(1)(A), and “any 
corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated 
organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal place of business in the United 
States, or which is organized under the laws of a State of the United States or a 
territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States,” id. § 78dd-2(h)(1)(B). 
 36 “Persons” are defined as “any natural person other than a national of the 
United States,” id. § 78dd-3(f)(1), as defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 
U.S.C. 1101 (2012). Further, the 1998 amendment to the FCPA extended the anti-
bribery provisions to apply to foreign firms and persons who engage in the proscribed 
conduct. RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 4. 
 37 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3. 
 38 Id. §§ 78dd-1(a)(1), 78dd-2(a)(1), 78dd-3(a)(1). “Foreign official” is defined as: 
[A]ny officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, 
or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, or any 
person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government 
or department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such 
public international organization. 
Id. §§ 78dd-1(f)(1)(A), 78dd-2(h)(2)(A), 78dd-3(f)(2)(A). 
 39 Id. §§ 78dd-1(a)(2), 78dd-2(a)(2), 78dd-3(a)(2). 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. §§ 78dd-1(f)(1)(A), 78dd-2(h)(2)(A), 78dd-3(f)(2)(A). 
 42 Id. §§ 78dd-1(a)(3), 78dd-2(a)(3), 78dd-3(a)(3). 
 43 Id. §§ 78dd-1(a)(1)-(2), 78dd-2(a) (1)-(2), 78dd-3(a)(1)-(2). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
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any act or decision of [a foreign] government or instrumentality.”46 
The DOJ enforces the anti-bribery provisions through civil and 
criminal penalties.47 
2. Books and Records and Internal Controls Provisions 
The FCPA imposes two categories of accounting 
requirements. The first category is set forth in the books and 
records provision, which requires issuers to “make and keep 
books, records,48 and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, 
accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of 
the assets of the issuer . . . .”49 “Reasonable detail” is defined as 
“such level of detail . . . as would satisfy prudent officials in the 
conduct of their own affairs.”50 It is important to note that 
“accurately” does not require “exact precision,” but the records 
should “reflect transactions in conformity with generally 
accepted accounting principles or other applicable criteria.”51 
The second category is set forth in the internal controls 
provision, which requires issuers to “devise and maintain a 
system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide 
reasonable assurances” of compliance.52 
Together, the books and records and internal controls 
provisions give “the SEC authority over the entire financial 
management and reporting requirements of publicly held United 
States corporations.”53 The SEC enforces the books and records 
and internal controls provisions through civil penalties.54 
3. The Facilitating Payments Exception 
Since its passage in 1977, the FCPA has excluded 
certain foreign payments from the anti-bribery provisions. The 
current language was added as part of the 1988 amendments. 
 
 46 Id. 
 47 Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its 
Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 395 (2010).  
 48 The Exchange Act defines “records” to include “accounts, correspondence, 
memorandums, tapes, discs, papers, books, and other documents or transcribed 
information of any type, whether expressed in ordinary or machine language.” 15 
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(37). Adding the words “books” and “accounts” broadens the scope of the 
recordkeeping required under the FCPA. 
 49 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A). 
 50 Id. § 78m(b)(7). 
 51 S. REP. No. 95-114, at 8 (1977). 
 52 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B). 
 53 SEC. v. World-Wide Coin Investments, Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 746 (N.D. 
Ga. 1983). 
 54 Koehler, supra note 47, at 396. 
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When Congress enacted them, however, “[b]oth houses insisted 
that their proposed amendments only clarified ambiguities 
‘without changing the basic intent or effectiveness of the law.’”55 
As such, these amendments simply made “the facilitating 
payments [exception] an express part of the statute.”56 
The statute now removes from the scope of the FCPA 
“any facilitating or expediting payment to a foreign official, 
political party, or party official the purpose of which is to expedite 
or to secure the performance of a routine governmental action by 
a foreign official, political party, or party official.”57 In addition, 
the statute defines the term “routine governmental action” with a 
non-exhaustive list of exempted payments.58 But the statute 
provides this qualification: 
[T]he term . . . does not include any decision by a foreign official 
whether, or on what terms, to award new business to or to continue 
business with a particular party, or any action taken by a foreign official 
involved in the decisionmaking process to encourage a decision to award 
new business to or continue business with a particular party.59 
II. MORAL AMBIGUITY AND THE FCPA 
This part argues that a sense of moral ambiguity and 
compromise surrounded the passage of the FCPA in 1977. The 
legislative history reveals that, in the early stages, lawmakers 
viewed foreign bribery as an undesirable source of conflict between 
the United States and foreign governments. They feared, however, 
 
 55 United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 750 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing S. REP. No. 
100-85, at 54 (1987); H.R. REP. No. 100-40, pt. 2, at 77 (1987)). 
 56 Diamant & Mrdjenovic, supra note 8, at 22. 
 57 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(2), 78dd-2(h)(3), 78dd-3(f)(3). 
 58 Id. §§ 78dd-1(f)(3)(A)(i)-(v), 78dd-2(h)(4)(A), 78dd-3(f)(4)(A). These sections 
of the United States Code elaborate as follows: 
The term “routine governmental action” means only an action which is 
ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official in— 
(i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a person 
to do business in a foreign country; 
(ii) processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders; 
(iii) providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or scheduling 
inspections associated with contract performance or inspections related to 
transit of goods across country; 
(iv) providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and unloading 
cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities from deterioration; or 
(v) actions of a similar nature. 
 59 Id. §§ 78dd-1(f)(3)(B), 78dd-2(h)(4)(B), 78dd-3(f)(4)(B). 
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that prohibiting bribery would put American firms at a 
disadvantage. Closer to the time the FCPA was enacted, normative 
rationales rejecting bribery as immoral gained prominence. 
Ultimately, Congress took a balanced approach that did not resolve 
the question of why bribery is wrong, and that recognized the 
necessity of limited amounts of foreign bribery. 
A. Arguments for and against Legislative Action 
Congress grappled over an interrelated set of 
considerations for and against taking legislative action. This is 
evident in the House report,60 the Senate report,61 and the House 
conference report62 associated with S. 305 and H.R. 3815, the two 
bills that led to the FCPA as enacted. These documents focused 
on the perceived moral repugnancy of bribery and are discussed 
below. Although this consideration was a recurring thread 
throughout the legislative process, foreign bribery initially was 
cast mainly as a foreign policy issue. 
With respect to foreign policy, Congress was concerned 
that misconduct by American firms would affect relationships 
between the United States and foreign governments. Moreover, 
there was the worry that paying off foreign officials would 
harm America’s standing abroad, serving as a tacit admission 
that capitalism was flawed or unworkable, that fair 
competition based on price and quality, not on greased palms, 
was a story for the gullible. George Ball, a Democrat, described 
the setback that would result from the battle for hearts and 
minds: “This is a problem that, like so many others, has relevance 
in the struggle of antagonistic ideologies; for, when our 
enterprises stoop to bribery and kickbacks, they give substance to 
the communist myth . . . that capitalism is fundamentally 
corrupt.”63 In this way, the legislative history suggests that 
Congress was motivated, in part, by the goal of “promoting values 
and building alliances through the active, deliberate exportation 
of anticorruption norms.”64 
Running counter to arguments in favor of legislative 
action was an obvious danger—cracking down on foreign 
 
 60 H.R. REP. No. 95-640 (1977). 
 61 S. REP. No. 95-114 (1977). 
 62 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-831 (1977). 
 63 Foreign and Corporate Bribes: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Banking, 
Hous., & Urb. Aff., 94th Cong. 41-42 (1976) (statement of George Ball, Lehman Brothers) 
(quoted in Andrew Brady Spalding, The Irony of International Business Law: U.S. 
Progressivism and China’s New Laissez-Faire, 59 UCLA L. REV. 354, 373-74 (2011)). 
 64 Spalding, supra note 63, at 373. 
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bribery would handicap American firms. Other things being 
equal, American firms would lose out to foreign firms that had 
deep pockets and were willing to reach into them. This concern 
explains why, from the beginning, discussions concerning 
foreign bribery included the importance of convincing other 
countries to adopt similar rules. On October 6, 1975, at a 
hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on International 
Trade of the Committee on Finance, Senator Frank Church 
emphasized the need for an international agreement to 
accompany any U.S. legislation.65 Several months later, before the 
Subcommittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the 
International Chamber of Commerce testified that without 
international cooperation, prohibitions on foreign bribery “could, 
and in some cases would, mitigate [sic] severely against U.S. 
business and prevent it from being able to compete effectively 
in quite substantial markets of the world.”66 
B. Justifications for the FCPA as Enacted in 1977 
The legislative history most useful to understanding the 
FCPA as it was enacted in 1977 consists of the Senate report 
accompanying S. 305, the House report accompanying H.R. 
3815, and President Carter’s signing statement. Both reports 
articulate the notion that bribery has no place in business 
predicated on fair competition.67 Both also refer to the manner 
in which foreign bribery initially was framed—as a foreign 
policy issue.68 Specifically, the worry focused on the harm that 
could—and indeed, did—result to relationships between the 
United States and foreign governments. An oft-cited example is 
the revelation that Lockheed Martin had bribed foreign 
officials in Japan, the Netherlands, and Italy for government 
business.69 Understandably, the peoples of these countries 
reacted unfavorably to the news and placed “intense pressure” 
on the officials to explain themselves.70 That the company 
 
 65 Senator Church disassociated himself and the subcommittee from “any desire 
to unfairly penalize U.S. companies in the competition for foreign markets.” Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Int’l Trade of the Comm. on Fin., 94th Cong. 10 (1975) (testimony of Sen. 
Frank Church) (quoted in Koehler Declaration, supra note 6, at 23). 
 66 Foreign and Corporate Bribes: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Banking, 
Hous., & Urb. Aff., 94th Cong. 39, 49 (1976) (testimony of Sen. Frank Church). 
 67 See S. REP. No. 95-114, at 4 (1977); H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 4 (1977). 
 68 See S. REP. No. 95-114, at 3; H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 5. 
 69 Bruce W. Klaw, A New Strategy for Preventing Bribery and Extortion in 
International Business Transactions, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 303, 307 (2012). 
 70 S. REP. No. 95-114, at 3 (1977). 
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involved was American led to “concomitant diplomatic 
problems for the United States.”71 
The legislative history also considers normative rationales 
that reject bribery as immoral. Senate report 95-114 quotes 
Secretary of State W. Michael Blumenthal, who testified that 
bribery was “morally repugnant and illegal in most 
countries . . . .”72 The report concludes its section on the need for 
legislation by stating, “[a] strong antibribery law is urgently 
needed to bring these corrupt practices to a halt and to restore 
public confidence in the integrity of the American business 
system.”73 House report 95-640 describes the bribery of foreign 
officials as “unethical”74 and “counter to the moral expectations 
and values of the American public.”75 It continues, “[foreign 
bribery] rewards corruption instead of efficiency and puts 
pressure on ethical enterprises to lower their standards or risk 
losing business.”76 In his signing statement, President Carter 
wrote, “I share Congress [sic] belief that bribery is ethically 
repugnant and competitively unnecessary.”77 
C. Congress’s Balanced Approach and the Facilitating 
Payments Exception 
It is striking that the legislative history is replete with 
statements that bribery is wrong, but nearly devoid of 
explanations as to why. The quotations above are representative 
in that they advance a moral position that is seemingly self-
evident and axiomatic. Some commentators have attributed the 
motivation behind passing the FCPA to the Puritan religious 
worldview of the settlers, which “fundamentally influenced the 
American sense of morality.”78 Professors George and Lacey 
suggest that the Puritan notion equating success in business 
 
 71 Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Int’l Econ. Pol’y & Trade, 95th Cong. 8 
(1975) (testimony of Rep. Robert C. Eckhardt) (quoted in Koehler Declaration, supra 
note 6, at 81). 
 72 S. REP. No. 95-114, at 4. 
 73 Id. 
 74 H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 4 (1977). 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 5. 
 77 Jimmy Carter, Foreign Corrupt Practices and Investment Disclosure Bill; 
Statement on Signing S. 305 into Law, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2157 (Dec. 20, 1977), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7036 (quoted in Koehler, supra note 
12, at 913). 
 78 Barbara Crutchfield George & Kathleen A. Lacey, A Coalition of 
Industrialized Nations, Developing Nations, Multilateral Development Banks, and Non-
Governmental Organizations: A Pivotal Complement to Current Anti-Corruption 
Initiatives, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 547, 554-55 (2000). 
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with “proof of divine favor” was the underlying cause of a 
“righteous indignation” against those who appear not to play by 
the rules.79 This is a plausible explanation, but it is difficult to 
prove and at least one commentator is not persuaded.80 
Alternatively, Congress may have believed that bribery 
was objectionable because of its adverse consequences. Foreign 
payments may be wrong because they run afoul of a certain 
conception of fair competition in business. Or they may be 
wrong because they turn friendly relationships between the 
United States and foreign governments into something decidedly 
less so. Unfortunately, there is no clear indication in the 
legislative history that ties the condemnations of bribery as 
“morally repugnant”81 to these rationales for addressing foreign 
bribery. Insofar as divining legislative intent, such a 
consequentialist view does not give a clear answer. 
There are, however, reasons to believe that Congress 
was aware of some of the conceptual difficulties when thinking 
about bribery in moral terms. The first, noted above, is the lack 
of affirmative explanations for why bribery is wrong. The second 
is the recognition of how difficult it is to legislate against a 
phenomenon—i.e., bribery of the sort that we feel should not be 
permitted—whose contours are difficult to define.82 
There is a third reason to believe that Congress struggled 
with and left unresolved the moral ambiguity surrounding 
bribery—the FCPA’s facilitating payments exception, which 
permits small bribes for “routine governmental action.” This is 
not to say that the carve-out was purely the result of conceptual 
confusion. Rather, the exception may best be understood as 
 
 79 Id. 
 80 See Elizabeth Spahn, International Bribery: The Moral Imperialism 
Critiques, 18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 155, 170-71 (2009) (noting that Professors George and 
Lacey point to no supporting evidence in the legislative debates that American Puritan 
ethics were a motivating factor behind the FCPA). 
 81 S. REP. No. 95-114, at 6 (1977). 
 82 Statements by William Simon, Secretary of the Treasury, before the 
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, are illustrative. Asked by 
Senator Proxmire for his thoughts on S. 3133, Secretary Simon responded: “[I]t’s very 
difficult to put it down on paper in statutory language that would not be damaging to 
some other legitimate things . . . . It’s almost like the Justice who said that he can’t 
define pornography, but he knows what it is when he sees it.” Koehler Declaration, 
supra note 6, at 31 (quoting Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban 
Aff., 94th Cong. 1 (1976) (testimony of William Simon, Secretary of the Treasury)). The 
following month, Senator Proxmire expressed a related frustration at a hearing before 
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. He stated, “[S]omehow we can’t 
bring ourselves, at least the executive branch can’t seem to bring itself to a clear-cut 
definition of this action as illegal and then take effective action to prevent it.” Id. at 39 
(quoting Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Aff., 94th Cong. 2 
(1976) (testimony of Sen. William Proxmire)). 
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stemming from three related causes—moral ambiguity 
surrounding bribery; a concern that the FCPA was an exercise 
of moral imperialism by the United States; but the belief that 
certain, arguably de minimis, forms of bribery were necessary 
for conducting business. 
III. CHINA 
This part turns to China and recognizes its importance 
to the United States as a trade partner and as an enormous 
growth market. It then describes the cultural notions of guanxi 
(relationships) and mianzi (social standing). Together, guanxi 
and mianzi emphasize the need to build personal relationships, 
to reciprocate in exchanging gifts and favors, and to cultivate 
and leverage one’s reputation. Lastly, this part considers some 
of the ways in which Chinese culture complicates conducting 
business while complying with the FCPA. 
A. The Importance of China 
It is difficult to overstate China’s importance to the 
United States, both as a trade partner and as an enormous 
growth market. China is the second-largest trade partner of the 
United States, surpassed only by Canada.83 In 2009, China took 
Germany’s place as both the world’s third-largest economy84 
and the world’s largest exporter.85 The following year, China 
made headlines when it unseated Japan as the world’s second-
largest economy,86 a title Japan had held for more than 40 
years.87 China is predicted to become the world’s largest 
 
 83 Foreign Trade—Top Trading Partners, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 2013), 
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/toppartners.html. 
 84 Ashley Seager, China Becomes World’s Third-Largest Economy, GUARDIAN, 
Jan. 14, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/jan/14/china-world-
economic-growth. 
 85 China ‘Overtakes Germany as World’s Largest Exporter,’ BBC NEWS (Jan. 
10, 2010, 10:05 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8450434.stm. 
 86 David Barboza, China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 15, 2010, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/business/
global/16yuan.html. 
 87 Justin McCurry & Julia Kollewe, China Overtakes Japan As World’s Second-
Largest Economy, GUARDIAN, Feb. 14, 2011, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
business/2011/feb/14/china-second-largest-economy. But it is worth noting that “the rapid 
overtaking of the Japanese economy also reflects years of disappointing growth there.” 
China: Second in Line, ECONOMIST FREE EXCH. BLOG (Aug. 16, 2010, 1:36 PM), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2010/08/china_0. 
938 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:2 
importer by 2014.88 Given America’s imports were six times 
those of China in 2000,89 this is a remarkable turnaround. 
Moreover, China’s retail sales could exceed America’s by 
2014.90 This estimate is no doubt because of the Chinese middle 
class, who earn between $10,000 and $60,000 per year.91 This 
demographic, estimated to include between 250 and 300 million 
people,92 is already roughly as large as the entire population of 
the United States.93 The Chinese middle class may grow to 
between 700 and 800 million people, or more than half of the 
entire population of China.94 
Given the significant trade relationship between the 
United States and China, and the continued growth of the 
Chinese middle class, the Chinese market is of profound 
importance to American firms. Moreover, the conditions in China 
provide a useful stress test for the FCPA and its problematic 
provisions. 
B. How Chinese Culture Complicates FCPA Compliance 
1. Guanxi 
Generally, guanxi refers to informal, long-term personal 
relationships95 somewhat similar to the Western concepts of 
connections and networking.96 Guanxi can refer both to specific 
relationships a person has with another individual or group of 
individuals, and to the bundle of relationships to which a 
 
 88 Economics Focus: How to Get a Date, ECONOMIST, Dec. 31, 2011, available 
at http://www.economist.com/node/21542155. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Tami Luhby, China’s Growing Middle Class, CNN MONEY (Apr. 26, 2012, 6:00 
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/04/25/news/economy/china-middle-class/index.htm (quoting 
one expert’s view on the salary range of China’s middle class). 
 92 MICHAEL ANDREW & PENG YALI, THE RISE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS IN ASIAN 
EMERGING MARKETS 2 (Apr. 2012), available at http://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/
IssuesAndInsigts/ArticlesPublications/Documents/Middle-Class-Asia-Emerging-
Markets-201206-2.pdf. 
 93 The United States Census Bureau estimated the population of the United 
States to be approximately 316 million in 2013. State and County QuickFacts—USA, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU (June 27, 2013, 1:52 PM), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/
00000.html. 
 94 Luhby, supra note 91. 
 95 Yi Zhang & Zigang Zhang, Guanxi and Organizational Dynamics in China: A 
Link Between Individual and Organizational Levels, 67 J. BUS. ETHICS 375, 375 (2006). 
 96 Patricia Pattison & Daniel Herron, The Mountains Are High and the 
Emperor is Far Away: Sanctity of Contract in China, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 459, 484 (2003). 
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person is a party, i.e., his or her “network.”97 But to appreciate 
the breadth of guanxi, it is important to understand how it 
differs from networking. At its core, guanxi is a social 
undertaking that arises from being part of a larger society.98 
The reason why guanxi pervades all aspects of Chinese society 
stems from its origins in Confucianism,99 which emerged 
between the fourth and fifth centuries B.C.100 Since that time, 
Confucianism as a social philosophy has espoused values of 
“duty, loyalty, honor, filial piety, kindness, sincerity, and 
respect for age and seniority.”101 To this day, Confucianism 
endures as a principal source of community values in China.102 
At a minimum, guanxi consists of “mutual obligations, 
assurances, and understanding.”103 Often, but not always, guanxi 
relationships—especially those between family members, friends, 
and business associates—entail some measure of emotional 
attachment or sympathy.104 For example, the extent to which two 
individuals get along and find common ground can determine 
the strength of their guanxi.105 While emotional attachment 
may or may not play a role in a given guanxi relationship, the 
sense of mutual indebtedness that results from exchanging 
gifts and favors is crucial.106 Both the need to reciprocate and 
the fact that repayment is often unequal serve to perpetuate 
the relationship.107 
It is common to conceive of guanxi as concentric circles 
that surround the individual. In the innermost circle are family 
members, by both marriage and birth.108 This reflects the role 
in Chinese culture of the family as the primary collective to 
which one belongs.109 Beyond the innermost circle are non-
 
 97 See Comprehensive Chinese-English Dictionary, NCIKU, http://www.nciku.com/
search/zh/detail/关系/1305381 (last visited Mar. 1, 2014) (defining guanxi as 
“relationship” and “relations”). 
 98 See Jane Tung, Guanxi and Ethics: A Study of Chinese Management 
Behaviour, 9 AM. J. APPLIED SCIS. 223, 223 (2012) (“Guanxi in China is recognized as a 
major activity in its world of business as well as the [sic] society.”). 
 99 Zhang & Zhang, supra note 95, at 378. 
 100 Gary Kok Yew Chan, The Relevance and Value of Confucianism in 
Contemporary Business Ethics, 77 J. BUS. ETHICS 347, 347 (2008). 
 101 Pattison & Herron, supra note 96, at 478. 
 102 Chan, supra note 100, at 347-48. 
 103 Seung Ho Park & Yadong Luo, Guanxi and Organizational Dynamics: 
Organizational Networking in Chinese Firms, 22 STRAT. MGMT. J. 455, 455 (2001). 
 104 Chris Provis, “Guanxi” and Conflicts of Interest, 79 J. BUS. ETHICS 57, 58 (2008). 
 105 Tung, supra note 98, at 224. 
 106 Pattison & Herron, supra note 96, at 485. 
 107 Hines, supra note 24, at 56. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Pattison & Herron, supra note 96, at 483. 
940 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:2 
family members, such as friends, acquaintances, coworkers, 
and business associates.110 The distance of a non-family 
member from the innermost circle depends on the nature of the 
affiliation and level of trust he or she shares with the 
individual.111 In the outermost circle are strangers, with whom 
the individual shares no guanxi.112 The Chinese generally feel 
no sense of obligation toward strangers.113 
2. Mianzi 
Mianzi, which translates into English as “face,”114 refers 
to an individual’s “public self-image.”115 It is a measure of social 
standing116 determined by various factors, such as one’s “post, 
credibility, reputation, power, income, or network.”117 The 
Chinese strive to maintain mianzi in the eyes of others to 
enhance their “reputation, recognition, and status.”118 One’s 
success in maintaining mianzi shapes his or her ability to 
cultivate and grow a guanxi network.119 More broadly, each 
individual’s relative position helps to maintain social order by 
indicating what is appropriate behavior for that individual.120 
The concept of social currency is helpful when thinking 
about how mianzi operates. To the Chinese, social status is 
something that can be measured, at least in relative terms.121 
Thus, one may have “a lot of face (mianzi da), not much face 
 
 110 Hines, supra note 24, at 56. 
 111 Zhang & Zhang, supra note 95, at 378 (citing MAYFAIR MEI-HUI YANG, 
GIFTS, FAVORS, AND BANQUETS: THE ART OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS IN CHINA (1994)). 
 112 See Zhang & Zhang, supra note 95, at 378-79 (rejecting the view that one 
can share guanxi with strangers because “common identity or an intermediary . . . is 
necessary in initiating Guanxi . . . .”). 
 113 Hines, supra note 24, at 57. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Peter W. Cardon & James Calvert Scott, Chinese Business Face: 
Communication Behaviors and Teaching Approaches, 66 BUS. COMM. Q. 9, 9 (2003) 
(quoting PENELOPE BROWN & STEPHEN C. LEVINSON, POLITENESS: SOME UNIVERSALS 
IN LANGUAGE USAGE (2d ed. 1987)). 
 116 Id. at 12 (citing Hsien Chin Hu, The Chinese Concepts of “Face”, 46 AM. 
ANTHROPOLOGIST 45 (1944); WENSHAN JIA, THE REMAKING OF THE CHINESE 
CHARACTER AND IDENTITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2001)) (“To have a lot of face 
essentially means that one has high status compared to others, whereas not to have 
much face or to have no face means to have low status.”). 
 117 Park & Luo, supra note 103, at n.1. 
 118 Victor P. Lau et al., Entrepreneurial Career Success from a Chinese 
Perspective: Conceptualization, Operationalization, and Validation, 38 J. INT’L BUS. 
STUD. 126, 137 (2007). 
 119 Park & Luo, supra note 103, at n.1. 
 120 Hines, supra note 24, at 57. 
 121 Cardon & Scott, supra note 115, at 12 (citing Hsien Chin Hu, The Chinese 
Concepts of “Face”, 46 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 45 (1944); WENSHAN JIA, THE REMAKING 
OF THE CHINESE CHARACTER AND IDENTITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2001)). 
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(mianzi xiao), no face (mei mianzi), or more face than others (ta 
de mianzi bijiao da).”122 The currency metaphor goes further. 
One can gain face (zengjia mianzi) or lose it (diu mianzi).123 For 
example, an individual may gain face by succeeding in business 
or by being associated with high-status individuals.124 On the 
other hand, he or she may lose face by “not keeping promises, 
meeting expectations, or disregarding social norms.”125 
Examples of behavior that result in losing face include directly 
contradicting a superior in front of a third party, speaking out 
of turn, or failing to return a favor. One can also lend or borrow 
face (jie mianzi).126 For example, an individual has borrowed face 
when he or she receives an introduction or a favor only because 
someone of higher status has intervened. The Chinese also think 
of face as something that can be protected (baohu mianzi), saved 
(liu mianzi), and given (gei mianzi) to enhance or acknowledge 
the face of others.127 
3. The Implications of Guanxi and Mianzi for FCPA 
Compliance 
The concepts of guanxi and mianzi, as well as other 
facets of Chinese culture, encourage the Chinese to maintain 
and foster harmony.128 The desire to avoid conflict has 
implications for business generally. Individuals may avoid 
“evaluation and constructive criticism.”129 An aversion to 
confrontation may keep unproductive employees from being 
dismissed and unprofitable companies from failing.130 As 
mentioned above, guanxi and mianzi require a mutually shared 
sense of obligation to sustain relationships. Professor Potter has 
described the dilemma as “not merely a matter of suspending 
moral or legal values,” but as reflecting “uncertainties and tensions 
as to the permissible parameters for guanxi behavior and the 
parameters for formal institutional behavior.”131 In other words, an 
 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Hines, supra note 24, at 58. 
 126 Id. at 13. 
 127 Cardon & Scott, supra note 115, at 14. 
 128 Pattison & Herron, supra note 96, at 488. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Provis, supra note 104, at 63 (quoting P. B. Potter, Guanxi and the PRC 
Legal System: From Contradiction to Complementarity, in SOCIAL CONNECTIONS IN 
CHINA: INSTITUTIONS, CULTURE, AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF GUANXI (T. Gold et al., 
eds.) 179-95 (2002)). 
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important ethical question is how guanxi “obligations are related to 
other ethical and moral commitments people have.”132 
More specifically, American firms face a high risk of 
violating the FCPA when they try to adhere to the Chinese 
customs of guanxi and mianzi.133 This is in large part because 
“bribery is related to the gift-giving ethos in China.”134 Gifts, 
particularly in Chinese culture, show that a relationship is 
valued and are expressions of respect for the recipient.135 The 
need for reciprocity that attaches to gift giving follows from the 
principle of li—Confucian ritual action.136 Professor Tian has 
suggested, however, that bringing expensive gifts to superiors to 
show respect or to request special privileges reflects “a transition 
from the ritual action ‘Li’ to the secular Li,” i.e., a gift.137 
An everyday application of these Chinese customs may 
easily violate the FCPA. Professor Hines describes one of these 
possibilities: 
Imagine a scenario where X, an employee in a Chinese subsidiary, 
borrows the face of Y, a family member of Z, in order to be introduced 
to Z, a foreign official, who then offers X a major contract or other 
business deal. However, in order to [sic] for the deal to go through, Z 
insists that X pay Y a large “service fee.” In China, such a payment is 
viewed as maintaining and building guanxi (network/connections). 
However, under the FCPA a violation has occurred because X, an 
employee in a Chinese subsidiary, has bribed a foreign official, Z. Even 
though Z did not receive the payment himself, he received a benefit from 
Y receiving the payment. Thus, Z has received a “thing of value” under 
the Act.138 
IV. RECENT ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS IN CHINA 
To elaborate on the preceding discussion of guanxi and 
mianzi, this part provides concrete examples of behavior that is 
common when doing business in China, but that violates the 
FCPA. The case studies concern three U.S. companies with 
Chinese subsidiaries—Eli Lilly and Company, International 
Business Machines Corporation, and Maxwell Technologies, 
Inc. The DOJ, the SEC, or both have charged these companies 
 
 132 Id. at 58. 
 133 Hines, supra note 24, at 21-22. 
 134 Qing Tian, Perception of Business Bribery in China: The Impact of Moral 
Philosophy, 80 J. BUS. ETHICS 437, 438 (2008). 
 135 Id. at 443. 
 136 Id. (citing QING TIAN, A TRANSCULTURAL STUDY OF ETHICAL PERCEPTIONS 
AND JUDGMENTS BETWEEN CHINESE AND GERMAN BUSINESSMEN (2004)). 
 137 Id. 
 138 Hines, supra note 24, at n.190. 
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and/or their subsidiaries with violating the anti-bribery, books 
and records, and internal controls provisions of the FCPA, and 
Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act. These case studies form part 
of the trend, in recent years, of China being a “significant 
demand-side country” for FCPA violations.139 Indeed, nearly 
one-third of FCPA enforcement actions in 2012 involved 
improprieties in China.140 
A. Eli Lilly and Company 
Eli Lilly and Company (Lilly) operates in more than 143 
countries141 and manufactures drugs for treating, among other 
things, diabetes,142 pancreatic cancer,143 and osteoporosis.144 
From 2000 to 2009, Lilly foreign subsidiaries made improper 
payments not only in China, but also in Brazil, Poland, and 
Russia.145 In China, Lilly has a wholly owned subsidiary (Lilly-
China) whose sales representatives targeted government-
employed health-care providers.146 
Between 2006 and 2009,147 there were widespread and 
repeated instances of Lilly-China employees submitting false 
expense reports and then using the reimbursed amounts to pay 
for improper gifts and benefits.148 The recipients were primarily 
government-employed physicians,149 who received wine, specialty 
foods, jewelry, cosmetics, meals, and visits to bathhouses and 
karaoke bars.150 In addition, government officials who could 
improve sales in China by placing Lilly products on “government 
reimbursement lists” received cigarettes, meals, and spa 
 
 139 SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, FCPA DIGEST: RECENT TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN 
THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 7 (2012), available at 
http://www.shearman.com/files/Publication/bb1a7bff-ad52-4cf9-88b9-9d99e001dd5f/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/6ec0766a-25aa-41ec-8731-041a672267a6/FCPA-
Digest-Trends-and-Patterns-Jan2012.pdf. 
 140 GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2012 YEAR-END FCPA UPDATE 25 
(2013), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/
2012YearEndFCPAUpdate.pdf. 
 141 Complaint ¶ 5, SEC v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 1:12-cv-02045 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp-pr2012-273.pdf. 
 142 See Human, Eli Lilly & Co., http://www.lilly.com/products/human/Pages/
human.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
 143 See GEMZAR, http://pi.lilly.com/us/gemzar.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
 144 See About Forteo, FORTEO, http://www.forteo.com/Pages/osteoporosis-
medication.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
 145 Complaint ¶¶ 1-2, SEC v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 1:12-cv-02045. 
 146 Id. ¶ 16. 
 147 Id. ¶ 2. 
 148 Id. ¶¶ 17-20. 
 149 Id. ¶¶ 17-19. 
 150 Id. ¶¶ 18-19. 
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treatments.151 In response, Lilly has dismissed or disciplined 
employees who engaged in this prohibited conduct.152 
As a result of these improprieties, the SEC charged 
Lilly-China with violating the books and records provision by 
falsifying expense reports and then using the reimbursed 
amounts to pay for perquisites.153 The SEC also charged Lilly 
with violating the internal controls provision, which requires 
the company to “devise and maintain an adequate system of 
internal accounting.”154 First, the SEC alleged, Lilly relied on 
written assurances from Lilly-China employees that they were 
not giving improper gifts to obtain or retain business.155 Second, 
Lilly’s audit department lacked procedures for ensuring that 
foreign transactions complied with the FCPA.156 
Without admitting to wrongdoing, Lilly “consented to 
the entry of a final judgment permanently enjoining the 
company from violating the . . . books and records[ ]  and 
internal control[ ]  provisions of the FCPA.”157 Moreover, Lilly 
agreed to disgorge approximately $13.9 million in ill-gotten 
gains, pay approximately $6.7 million in prejudgment interest, 
and pay a penalty of $8.7 million.158 
B. International Business Machines Corporation 
International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) is a 
multinational technology and consulting company operating in 
more than 170 countries.159 IBM manufactures, configures, and 
sells a variety of products, which include IT infrastructure 
services, enterprise-level software, point-of-sale retail systems, 
semiconductors, and data storage products.160 IBM (China) 
Investment Company Limited and IBM Global Services (China) 
Co., Ltd. (collectively, IBM-China) are wholly owned subsidiaries 
of IBM.161 From 2004 to 2009,162 employees of IBM-China created 
 
 151 Id. ¶ 20. 
 152 Id. ¶ 21. 
 153 Id. ¶ 44. 
 154 Id. ¶¶ 45-46. 
 155 Id. ¶ 45. 
 156 Id. ¶ 46. 
 157 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Eli Lilly and 
Company with FCPA Violations (Dec. 20, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/
PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171487116. 
 158 Id. 
 159 IBM, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 25 (2012), available at http://www.ibm.com/
annualreport/2012/bin/assets/2012_ibm_annual.pdf. 
 160 Id. at 21-24. 
 161 Complaint ¶ 3, SEC v. IBM Corp., No. 1:11-cv-00563 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21889.pdf. 
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slush funds, some at local travel agencies to pay for overseas 
trips, and others to provide improper gifts, such as cash payments 
and consumer electronics.163 Chinese government officials 
received both overseas trips and improper gifts.164 IBM-China 
entered into contracts with “government-owned or controlled 
customers in China” to provide training on how to use IBM 
hardware and software.165 IBM held some of this training off-
site.166 Certain trips deviated from preapproved itineraries, which 
detailed a trip’s business purpose and “sightseeing and 
entertainment activities.”167 Other trips did not have preapproved 
itineraries at all, and had little to no business content or provided 
per diem payments.168 
The SEC charged IBM “with violating the books and 
records and internal control provisions of the . . . FCPA.”169 During 
the period in question, IBM had policies prohibiting bribery and 
addressing FCPA compliance.170 But on more than 100 occasions, 
trips that did not follow preapproved itineraries or were otherwise 
objectionable somehow escaped detection.171 In this manner, “IBM 
failed to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting 
controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances, among other 
things, that . . . transactions were executed in accordance with 
management’s general or specific authorization . . . .”172 IBM-China 
also designated certain travel agents as “authorized training 
providers” and paid them for “training services.”173 These sums 
paid for trips that lacked preapproved itineraries.174 The SEC 
alleged that IBM-China violated the books and records provision by 
recording improper payments as legitimate business expenses.175 
Like Lilly, IBM did not admit to wrongdoing and 
“consented to the entry of a final judgment that permanently 
enjoins the company from violating the books and records and 
                                                                                                             
 162 Id. ¶ 3. 
 163 Id. ¶ 32. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. ¶ 33. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. ¶¶33-34 
 168 Id. ¶ 34. 
 169 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, IBM to Pay $10 Million in 
Settled FCPA Enforcement Action (Mar. 18, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/litreleases/2011/lr21889.htm. 
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internal control provisions of the FCPA . . . .”176 Moreover, IBM 
agreed to disgorge approximately $5.3 million in ill-gotten 
gains and pay $2.7 million in prejudgment interest.177 
C. Maxwell Technologies, Inc. 
Maxwell Technologies, Inc. (Maxwell), a Delaware 
corporation headquartered in California,178 manufactures 
energy storage and power delivery products.179 Maxwell 
Technologies S.A. (Maxwell SA) is a wholly owned Swiss 
subsidiary.180 Maxwell SA employed a Chinese national as a 
third-party agent who marketed and sold Maxwell’s high-
voltage capacitors to Chinese customers.181 
“From 2002 through May 2009, Maxwell . . . paid over 
$2.5 million in kickback payments to officials at several 
Chinese state-owned entities” through its Chinese agent.182 On 
behalf of Chinese customers, the Chinese agent requested price 
quotations from Maxwell SA and instructed Maxwell SA to inflate 
the prices by 20%.183 Upon receiving the power equipment, the 
Chinese customers paid those inflated prices to Maxwell SA.184 
The Chinese agent then “invoiced [Maxwell SA] for the ‘extra’ 20 
percent . . . .”185 Once the Chinese agent received these amounts, 
he paid them as bribes to employees of the state-owned entities.186 
As a result of these improprieties, Maxwell was subject to 
enforcement actions by both the DOJ and the SEC.187 The DOJ 
charged Maxwell with violating the anti-bribery provisions because 
it knowingly permitted the Chinese agent to continue transferring 
the extra amounts to employees of state-owned entities in return 
 
 176 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 169. 
 177 Id. 
 178 MAXWELL TECHS., INC., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 69 (2011), available at 
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 179 Company Overview, MAXWELL TECHS., http://www.maxwell.com/about_us/
company-overview (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
 180 Complaint ¶ 2, SEC v. Maxwell Techs., Inc., No. 1:11-cr-00258 (D.D.C. Jan. 
31, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21832.pdf. 
 181 Information ¶ 11, United States v. Maxwell Techs., Inc., No. 3:11-cr-00329 
(S.D. Cal. 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/maxwell/01-
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 182 Complaint ¶ 2, SEC v. Maxwell Techs., Inc., No. 1:11-cr-00258. 
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Technologies for Long-Running Bribery Scheme in China (Jan. 31, 2011), available at 
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for business.188 Further, the DOJ charged Maxwell with violating 
the books and records provision by recording these improper 
payments as commissions, and by labeling them “Extra Amount” 
or “Special Arrangement.”189 
The SEC charged Maxwell with violating the internal 
controls provision, because Maxwell failed to determine why 
the contract prices were artificially inflated, failed to mandate 
FCPA training for certain employees, and because senior 
officers and managers did not stop improprieties of which they 
were aware.190 Finally, the SEC charged Maxwell with violating 
Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act by recording the bribes “as 
sales commission expenses in its financials.”191 
Maxwell entered into a deferred prosecution agreement 
with the DOJ.192 Under the agreement, the DOJ agreed not to 
prosecute Maxwell for three years and seven calendar days.193 
Further, the DOJ agreed to release Maxwell from criminal 
liability after that time as long as Maxwell complies with the 
agreement.194 In exchange, Maxwell must continue cooperating 
with the DOJ in any ongoing investigation “relating to corrupt 
payments, related false books and records, and inadequate 
internal controls.”195 Maxwell must also continue implementing a 
compliance program “designed to prevent and detect violations of 
the FCPA and other applicable anti-corruption laws.”196 Finally, 
Maxwell must review its internal controls, improving and 
supplementing them as necessary.197 
Maxwell also reached a settlement with the SEC, in which 
it “consented to the entry of a final judgment that permanently 
enjoins the company from future violations of” Section 13(a) of the 
Exchange Act, and the anti-bribery, books and records, and 
internal controls provisions of the FCPA.198 Moreover, Maxwell 
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agreed to disgorge approximately $5.6 million in ill-gotten gains 
and pay nearly $700,000 in prejudgment interest.199 
V. TOWARD A RECONCEIVED LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
The preceding parts of this note have described the 
development and present-day reality of FCPA enforcement. Part I 
provided a brief history of the FCPA, which became law after 
hundreds of U.S. companies admitted to paying more than $300 
million in overseas bribes. Part II concluded from examining the 
legislative history that a reflexive conviction that bribery is 
morally reprehensible sat uneasily alongside the facilitating 
payments exception. This exception reflects the moral ambiguity 
surrounding bribery, the concern that the United States was 
imposing its normative standards on other countries, and the 
belief that certain, arguably de minimis, forms of bribery 
ultimately were necessary. 
Part III recognized that the cultural notions of guanxi 
and mianzi are deeply rooted in Chinese culture and invariably 
affect how individuals do business. Part IV elaborated on the 
abstract descriptions in Part III by providing examples of 
behavior that without question was informed by guanxi and 
mianzi, and that led to charges of violating the FCPA and the 
Exchange Act. In China, payments and gifts outside the 
boundaries of rules and regulations often are not seen as 
immoral, which further underscores the difficulty of relying on 
moral intuitions. 
This part considers two examples of corruption in China 
that have threatened public health and safety. These incidents 
raise the possibility that overseas corruption could one day 
harm American consumers. Given the trade relationship between 
the United States and China, this risk will only increase with 
time. Next, this part argues in favor of recognizing a public-safety 
rationale for prohibiting foreign bribery. Recognizing a public-
safety rationale suggests two reforms. First, the prohibition of 
foreign bribery should be expanded to include all recipients. 
Second, to mitigate increases in compliance costs and decrease 
uncertainty, the FCPA should include a compliance defense that 
operates as a matter of law. In addition to suggesting specific 
reforms, the public-safety rationale provides a reconceived 
legislative intent behind the FCPA, which will be necessary to 
amend it. 
 
 199 Id. 
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A. Threats to Public Health and Safety 
In recent years, China has attracted criticism for 
scandals that illustrate the dangers of an at-all-costs approach 
to business and economic growth. Not infrequently, this 
approach has had devastating consequences for public health and 
safety. Two examples are the bribery scandal that engulfed 
China’s State Food and Drug Administration, which led to the 
execution of Zheng Xiaoyu, its director, and the high-speed train 
collision in Wenzhou in 2011. 
For eight years, Zheng Xiaoyu led the State Food and 
Drug Administration, an agency that he lobbied to create.200 
During that time, eight drug companies showered him with 
bribes and gifts including a house, a car, cash, and stock,201 
together worth more than $850,000.202 During his tenure, 
Zheng approved more than 150,000 new drugs—a rate of 
nearly 19,000 new drugs per year.203 By contrast, the Food and 
Drug Administration approved only 35 new drugs in 2012.204 As 
a result of Zheng’s improprieties, 14 people died and hundreds 
possibly were injured after using Xinfu, an unsafe antibiotic.205 
In July 2011, one high-speed train collided with a train 
ahead of it, killing 40 people and injuring 172.206 Both trains had 
departed Beijing for the eastern city of Fuzhou.207 After 
concluding its investigation, the Chinese government attributed 
the accident to problematic track-signal equipment, which 
stopped working after being struck by lightning.208 The 
government’s report found several dozen additional instances of 
faulty equipment, which “called into question how the signal 
contracts were awarded in the first place.”209 One journalist who 
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investigated China’s Rail Ministry after the accident catalogued 
the widespread use of illegal subcontracting: “A single contract 
could be divvied up and sold for kickbacks, then sold again and 
again, until it reached the bottom of a food chain of labor, where 
the workers were cheap and unskilled.”210 For example, in 
November 2011, “a former cook with no engineering experience 
was found to be building a high-speed railway bridge using a crew 
of unskilled migrant laborers who substituted crushed stones for 
cement in the foundation.”211 
B. The Public-Safety Rationale for Prohibiting Foreign 
Bribery 
Given the trade relationship between the United States 
and China, and despite safety and quality control laws in the 
United States, the risk that problems in the supply chain will 
harm American consumers will only increase with time. For 
this reason, it is useful to supplant the moral ambiguity 
surrounding the FCPA with a consequentialist rationale for 
prohibiting bribery. That is, we can view bribery as morally 
objectionable—or, at least, as something that ought to be 
prohibited—because it can lead to significant dangers to public 
health and safety. 
1. How the FCPA Ought to Be Reformed 
Recognizing a public-safety rationale for prohibiting 
bribery suggests that the FCPA ought to be reformed. 
Reasonable minds can differ as to what reforms are 
appropriate. One possibility, however, is that the FCPA should 
prohibit bribing not only foreign government officials, but 
anyone at all. Expanding the statute in this manner is not 
without precedent. For example, the United Kingdom’s Bribery 
Act 2010—which applies to persons “ordinarily resident” in the 
United Kingdom and to companies that are based in, or that do 
business in, the United Kingdom—prohibits both giving bribes, 
no matter the recipient, as well as receiving them.212 Such a 
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change to the FCPA is consistent with the public-safety 
rationale because it recognizes that any bribe is a potential 
source of devastating harm, and it is of no moment who the 
recipient is. 
In addition to prohibiting foreign bribery no matter the 
recipient, the FCPA should also include a compliance defense. 
The argument, as Professor Koehler puts it, is that a “company’s 
pre-existing compliance policies and procedures, and its good faith 
efforts to comply with the FCPA, should be relevant as a matter of 
law when a non-executive employee or agent acts contrary to 
those policies and procedures and in violation of the FCPA.”213 
Unfortunately, the DOJ and SEC oppose such a compliance 
defense.214 It remains that the two agencies have sole discretion 
on whether to prosecute, and the degree to which they will 
recognize efforts to comply with the FCPA.215 
A compliance defense that is not subject to the whims of 
prosecutorial discretion would be a welcome companion to the 
first reform, i.e., expanding the prohibition of bribery to all 
recipients. The DOJ and SEC have already given detailed 
guidance on what makes a compliance program robust and 
appropriate to a given company.216 But they should go further to 
decrease uncertainty, and assure the business community that 
compliance programs will be taken into account when 
investigating potential FCPA violations. Expanding the 
prohibition of foreign bribery may increase compliance costs, but a 
compliance defense would mitigate this increase by enabling 
companies to better manage compliance risk elsewhere. 
2. A Reconceived Legislative Intent for Reforms to the 
FCPA 
The public-safety rationale for prohibiting bribery not 
only suggests certain reforms, but also serves as a reconceived 
legislative intent for them. This is necessary because reforms 
tied to public health and safety will likely require legislative 
action in the form of a third set of amendments to the FCPA. As 
for the two reforms mentioned above, both the DOJ’s and SEC’s 
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guidance217 and the current enforcement environment make clear 
that such changes simply are not in the offing. 
CONCLUSION 
When it comes to the FCPA, China has proved to be a 
source of both problems and solutions. The cultural notions of 
guanxi and mianzi present significant obstacles for U.S. 
companies, which, given the risk of steep fines and negative 
publicity, want to ensure that their Chinese subsidiaries do not 
violate the FCPA. In the face of these obstacles, however, 
recent high-profile incidents in China that affect public health 
and safety raise the possibility that overseas corruption could one 
day harm American consumers. Recognizing a public-safety 
rationale for prohibiting bribery abroad addresses the moral 
ambiguity surrounding the original passage of the FCPA, and 
suggests that it ought to be reformed. This note has argued for 
one possible set of reforms—expanding the prohibition of foreign 
bribery to all recipients, while decreasing uncertainty and 
controlling compliance costs with a compliance defense that 
operates as a matter of law, and is not subject to prosecutorial 
discretion. Further, the public-safety rationale provides a 
reconceived legislative intent that will be necessary to 
implement these reforms through an amendment to the FCPA. 
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